We provide some guidelines for deriving new projective hash families of cryptographic interest. Our main building blocks are so called group action systems; we explore what properties of these mathematical primitives may lead to the construction of cryptographically useful projective hash families. We point out different directions towards new constructions, deviating from known proposals arising from Cramer and Shoup's seminal work.
construction introducing a celebrated methodology for deriving IND-CCA schemes based on a new mathematical tool for cryptography: universal projective hash families. We start this contribution by recalling the basic notions and results related to this cryptographic primitive of increasing relevance (see Sect. 2). Also in [3, 4] , so called group systems were introduced by Cramer and Shoup as atomic building blocks for projective hash families. Moreover, choosing the underlying group system wisely, one could actually prove the derived projective hash family to be cryptographically useful in a very strict sense.
We introduce a generalization of Cramer and Shoup's group systems, called group action systems and prove that, similarly, simple properties of this building blocks guarantee the desired cryptographic robustness of the derived projective hash families. Section 3 is devoted to the introduction of this new primitive, as well as to pointing out which properties of the underlying group action systems are suited for cryptographic applications.
In search for specific constructions, in Sect. 4 we focus on a special type of group action systems, so called automorphism group systems, which are derived from the action of a certain subgroup of automorphisms on a given base group (these were recently defined in [13] ). Section 5 roughly sketches some other types of action group systems of (potential) cryptographic relevance. Also, we note there that our work can actually be seen as a generalization of Cramer and Shoup's original construction, for their celebrated abelian setting also yields concrete instances in our framework.
Some preliminaries

Cryptographically useful hash families
Families of hash functions have been widely used as essential building blocks of various cryptographic primitives. General hash functions are simply defined as mappings transforming n-bit strings into m-bit strings, which exist independently of any intractability assumption (See 3.5.1. of [6] ). Together with one way permutations, general hash functions allow for the construction of pseudorandom generators. So called universal hash families were first defined in [5] , as a tool for designing an algorithm for key storage and retrieval. The main feature of such families is, roughly speaking, a somehow strong collision resistance property. Later on, in 1989 [11] , Naor and Yung introduced so called universal one way hash functions, which fulfill a kind of relaxed collision resistance property, which is referred to as hardness to form designated collisions or target collision resistance (see [7] ). The existence of provable secure signature schemes can be derived from the existence of universal one way hash functions. Again, for a detailed discussion on the different definitions and application of these "classical" hash families, we refer the interested reader to [6, 7] .
Whilst the above mentioned families are efficiently computable and essentially play the role of protecting the integrity of certain values, we will focus on a more recent type of hash families, which in addition have a special behaviour w.r.t. a certain subset of their domain. So called universal projective hash families (in short, PHFs) were introduced by Cramer and Shoup [3, 4] as a valuable cryptographic primitive for deriving provable secure encryption schemes. We recall (informally) the basic definitions given in [4] :
Let X , Π be finite non-empty sets, and K some finite index set. Consider a family H = {H k : X −→ Π } k∈K of mappings from X into Π , and let α : K −→ S be a map from K into some finite non-empty set S (which may be seen as a projection).
Definition 1
Let H, K , X, Π, S, and α be as above. Then, for a given subset L ⊂ X , we refer to the tuple
. Moreover, we say that H is -ε-universal if for any x ∈ X \L and for k ∈ K (chosen uniformly at random), the probability of correctly guessing H k (x) from x and α(k) is at most ε. -ε-universal 2 if for any x, x * ∈ X \L , x = x * , for k ∈ K chosen uniformly at random, the probability of correctly guessing H k (x) from α(k) and H k (x * ) is at most ε. -ε-smooth if the probability distributions of (x, s, H k (x)) and (x, s, π), where k, x and π are chosen uniformly at random in K , X \L and Π , respectively, and
are statistically close to the uniform distribution over Π. 2 In the sequel and for the shake of readability we will often drop the prefix "ε" when this yields no ambiguity.
Note that the concepts above limit the amount of information about the behaviour of a map H k on X \L, given by α(k). Clearly, for each case α(k) determines H k | L completely. However, α(k) hardly gives any information about H k | X \L if the family is universal. If H is universal 2 , not even knowing, besides the projection given by α, some information about the behaviour of H on a fixed (arbitrary) point of X \L will help on guessing its action on a new point x ∈ X \L. Smoothness is achieved if, on average (taken over k ∈ K , x ∈ X \L), guessing H k (x) given α is no better than a random guess. Strongly universal 2 is roughly speaking worst-case smoothness, i.e., fixing any x ∈ X \L , H k (x) is (close to) a uniform random variable on Π , whose distribution is induced by choosing k uniformly at random. Moreover, this still holds if the behaviour of H on a given point of X \(L ∪ {x}) is known.
Further, note that the above properties are all information-theoretical, in the sense that they do not depend on the (hypothetical) hardness of any computational problem.
Relations among different types of PHFs
Clearly, Definition 1 results in a kind of hierarchy, as it is easy to see that strongly universal 2 PHFs are smooth, and similarly universal 2 PHFs are also universal. That is, roughly speaking, strongly universal 2 PHFs are the ones in which the projection gives least information about how {H k } k∈K acts on X \L , whereas given a PHF that can only be proven universal it may be the case that α leaks relevant information of what goes on outside L. However, there are efficient generic methods of "upgrading" the weaker types of PHFs to achieve more robust constructions. More precisely: -Cramer and Shoup gave a construction for turning any ε-universal PHF into ε-universal 2 (see Lemma 2 of [3] ); -applying the Leftover Hash Lemma [8] , Cramer and Shoup also give a way to construct a smooth 3 PHF from a given ε-universal PHF (Lemma 4 of [3] ); -given a concrete universal PHF, it is often possible to find a more efficient dedicated upgrading method than the ones mentioned above (see, for instance Sect. 7.3 of [3] ); -analogously as in Lemma 4 [3] , ε-universal 2 PHFs can be transformed into strongly universal 2 PHFs, by a similar application of the Leftover Hash Lemma, since given
Cryptographic applications of PHFs
Projective hash families are essential building blocks in some recent proposals of encryption schemes that can be proven IND-CCA secure in the standard model. Not only Cramer and Shoup's generic design for such schemes has lead to the construction of practical instantiations [2] [3] [4] , also recently Kurosawa and Desmedt [10] have proposed an efficient IND-CCA hybrid encryption scheme based on strongly universal 2 PHFs (see also [14] ). Also, a theoretical construction using non abelian groups as a base and inspired by that of Cramer and Shoup, has been presented in [13] .
Roughly speaking, in the encryption scheme proposed by Cramer and Shoup [3, 4] a message m ∈ Π is encrypted by using H k (x) as a one time pad; while the value of k is kept secret, x and α(k) are made public. Those holding k have access to a private evaluation algorithm allowing them to evaluate H k on any x ∈ X, whereas those holding only the public key can only access a public evaluation algorithm that computes H k (x) only for x ∈ L. IND-CCA security is achieved by appending to the ciphertext a "proof of integrity" obtained from a universal 2 HPS.
In [10] , Kurosawa and Desmedt design a hybrid encryption scheme where the image H k (x) of a point x ∈ L is used as input of a key derivation function supplying keys for both a symmetric encryption scheme and a message authentication code. Further applications of PHFs will surely appear in different areas of cryptography and some are actually already arising; for instance, recently Gennaro and Lindell [15] have proposed a general framework for password-based authenticated key exchange which makes use of smooth projective hash functions. Also, using smooth projective hash families with some additional properties Kalai designed a 2-out-of-1 oblivious transfer protocol that has been presented at Eurocrypt 2005 [9] .
Group-action based PHF
In search of suitable projective hash families that could be used for their above mentioned scheme, Cramer and Shoup designed a construction method that took as a starting point certain atomic abelian group theoretic tools, defined as group systems [3, 4] . We now generalize their definition in order to capture cases in which no underlying group structure on X is assumed.
Group action systems
Let X be a finite set and consider a finite (not necessarily abelian) group H left-acting on X. Thus, each element φ ∈ H can be seen as an element of the symmetric group on X, and for all
Take also S some finite group and χ : H −→ S a group homomorphism. Note that for any φ ∈ H , χ(φ) gives some (limited) information about φ, and thus χ provides partial information about the action of H on X. This partial information will eventually play the role of the information given by α in the PHFs we will be constructing. As a result, we will see that the action of group elements φ ∈ ker χ are those for which the projection α will be less informative; on the other hand, if all elements from ker χ fix a point x ∈ X, this means χ(φ) determines the value of φ(x) for all φ ∈ H. Definition 2 Let X , H , S and χ be defined as above. Then the tuple (X, H, χ, S) is called a group action system. Let us consider the action of ker χ in X , defined by the action of H. For any x ∈ X, let us denote by [x] the (ker χ)-orbit of x, i.e.,
Note that the action of H on the set of points that remain fixed by ker χ is completely determined by χ. Let us thus define
Observe that ker χ ⊆ Stab(L) although they are not necessarily equal. Also, H leaves L invariant, as for any φ ∈ H and x ∈ L , φx is fixed by all ψ ∈ ker χ, as there exists ρ ∈ ker χ s.t. ψφ = φρ and thus ψφx = φρx = φx.
As our aim is to construct cryptographically useful PHFs, the systems above will be useful for us if χ gives little information about the action of H on X \L; thus, we will be particularly interested in those systems for which the (ker χ)-orbits of elements in X \L are large.
Lemma 1 Let (X, H, χ, S) be a group action system, and let p be the smallest prime dividing
Proof Note that ker χ acts on X, and thus
Group action PHFs
As in [3, 4, 13] , we outline the construction of a projective hash family from a group action system plus some additional elements:
Let us consider a group action system (X, H, χ, S), and denote byh : K → H a bijection from a suitable index set K (which will later serve as the private key space). Noting that χ(h(k)) determines the action ofh(k) on L completely, it is easy to see that the tuple (H, K , X, L , X, S, χ •h) is a projective hash family.
Definition 4 Any PHF constructed from a group action system as described above is called group action projective hash family (AcPHF). Such a projective hash family is made explicit by the tuple (X, H, K , S, χ,h).
It is our aim to prove that, if the group action projective hash family has certain nice properties, the resulting AcPHF will be ε-universal for some ε > 0. We start by demonstrating that for any x ∈ X, choosing k ∈ K uniformly at random (that is, choosing uniformly at random a group element in H ), given χ(h(k)), there are exactly
Lemma 2 Let (X, H, χ, S) be a group action system and let x ∈ X. If φ ∈ H is chosen uniformly at random, once s = χ(φ) is given then φ is uniformly distributed on the coset χ −1 (s) and φx is uniformly distributed on the set {ψ x | ψ ∈ χ −1 (s)}, that is, on a set of cardinality equal to
Proof Clearly, as φ is chosen uniformly at random, once we fix s = χ(φ), the resulting distribution is uniform on χ −1 (s). Moreover, for any x ∈ X, φx is uniformly distributed on
provided that the sets
are of the same size for all y ∈ {ψ x, ψ ∈ χ −1 (s)}. But this is straightforward to see, as all S y are left cosets modulo ker χ ∩ Stab({x}).
Proposition 1 Let H = (X, H, K , S, χ,h) be a group action projective hash family. If the underlying group action system (X, H, χ, S) is p-diverse then H is 1/ p-universal.
Proof From Lemma 2, for any x ∈ X \L, the probability of guessing the right value ofh(k)x for a random choice of
Once a universal projective hash family is constructed choosing the right elements according to the results above, the generic method of [4] may be used in order to transform it into a smooth projective hash family. Moreover, this transformation is sometimes superfluous: in some special cases, smoothness can even be guaranteed directly.
Proposition 2 Let H = (X, H, K , S, χ,h) be a group action projective hash family. If the whole set X \L is a single orbit under the action of ker χ then H is |L|/|X |-smooth.
Proof Let x ∈ X \L. From Lemma 2,h(k)x is uniformly distributed on a set of size |[x]| = |X \L|. Then, the statistical distance betweenh(k)x and the uniform distribution on X is 1 2
thus the probability distribution ofh(k)x is |L|/|X |-close to the uniform distribution on X Thus, from a universal PHF one can derive a smooth PHF. Similarly, a simple extension of a universal PHF leads to the construction of a universal 2 PHF.
Universal 2 extended AcPHFs
In [4] , the authors outline a generic transformation from any ε-universal projective hash family to an ε-universal 2 extended projective hash family. As done in [3, 4, 13] we give a more efficient extension for the case of AcPHFs.
Let H = (X, H, K , S, χ,h) be a group action projective hash family such that the underlying group action system (X, H, χ, S) is p-diverse. Let q be the smallest prime factor of |H |. Furthermore, denote by n a positive integer and by E a finite set, which will be used to extend X and L as in [4] . Let us define a new extended projective hash familyĤ by means of n + 1 independent copies of H and a "gluing" function g H γ : H n+1 → H defined by:
Similarly, we define g S
where φ j ∈ χ −1 (s j ) for all j = 0, . . . , n. At this point,K = K n+1 ,Ŝ = S n+1 and the natural extensionsχ of χ andĥ ofh are considered. The set X is extended toX = X × E. Furthermore, givenk, we define Φk :
where Γ : (x, e) → (Γ 1 (x, e) , . . . , Γ n (x, e)) is an injective map from X × E into {0, . . . , q − 1} n . Let us denote byĤ the set {Φk |k ∈K }.
The soundness of our construction will rely on the commutativity of the following diagram:
We will now prove that
is a 1/ p-universal 2 projective hash family. Recall that this actually means that for any x ∈ X \L and e ∈ E ifk ∈K is chosen uniformly at random andχ(ĥ(k)), Φk(x * , e * ) are known (for some x * ∈ X \(L ∪ {x}) and e * ∈ E), the probability of guessing Φk(x, e) correctly is at most 1/ p. Let us start by obtaining an analogue of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 LetĤ be as above, x ∈ X and e ∈ E. Then, ifφ ∈ H n+1 is chosen uniformly at random, onceŝ =χ(φ) is fixed, then φ = g H Γ (x,e) (φ) is uniformly distributed on the coset χ −1 (s), where s = g S Γ (x,e) (ŝ). Moreover, φx is uniformly distributed on the set {ψ x | ψ ∈ χ −1 (s)}, that is, on a set of cardinality equal to |[x]|.
Proof It is easy to see that in the conditional probability space, φ is uniformly distributed on the set g H Γ (x,e) (χ −1 (ŝ)). Let us show that this set is just the coset χ −1 (s).
Conversely, g H Γ (x,e) (χ −1 (ŝ)) contains a whole coset modulo ker χ . To see this, pick an element ψ ∈ g H Γ (x,e) (χ −1 (ŝ)).
. From this point, the proof proceeds exactly as in Lemma 2.
Proposition 3 If (X, H, χ, S) is p-diverse thenĤ is a 1/ p-universal projective hash family.
Proof From Lemma 3, for any x ∈ X \L and e ∈ E, the probability of guessing the right value of Φk(x, e) = g H Γ (x,e) (ĥ(k))x for a random choice ofk ∈K givenχ(ĥ(k)) is 1/|[x]|, that is at most 1/ p.
Next, we show thatĤ is also universal 2 . (X, H, χ, S) x, e) , . . . , Γ n (x, e)) is injective. Now, for any fixed values φ j ∈ χ −1 (s j ) for j = 1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n let us consider the map
Lemma 4 Let
where, as above, φ = g H Γ (x,e) (φ) and φ * = g H Γ (x * ,e * ) (φ). By defining
we can write
The map i is injective. Indeed, consider two pairs
. Combining these two equalities, we obtain
, that leads to φ i =φ i and then to φ 0 =φ 0 . 4 Thus, i is injective. 4 Note that, as
. . , n. Then, the same occurs when the whole tupleφ is chosen uniformly at random inχ −1 (ŝ). Consequently, φ and φ * are independent uniformly distributed random variables. (X, H, χ, S) is p-diverse thenĤ is a 1/ p-universal 2 projective hash family.
Proposition 4 If
Proof The independence from Lemma 4 in particular implies that knowledge of Φk(x * , e * ) = φ * x * does not affect the probability distribution of Φk(x, e) = φx.
Thus, by Lemma 3, Φk(x, e) is uniformly distributed on a set of size |[x]|. Then,Ĥ is 1/ p-universal 2 .
Proposition 5 If (X, H, χ, S) is p-diverse and H is ε-smooth (worst-case) thenĤ is a strongly ε-universal 2 projective hash family.
Proof Clearly, by Lemmas 3 and 4, Φk(x, e) is uniformly distributed on a set of size |[x]|, independently of the value of Φk(x * , e * ). As H is ε-smooth then Φk(x, e) = φx is ε-close the uniform distribution in X, for any choice of x ∈ X \L and e ∈ E.
Recall that Cramer and Shoup's construction for an IND-CCA encryption scheme required a hard subset membership problem M and two suitable HPSs. From the above results it follows that these may be derived from suitable group action systems. Similarly, diverse group action systems provide strongly universal 2 projective hash families for the Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme.
A special case: automorphism group PHFs
Let us suppose we consider a group action system consisting of a group X and a suitable subgroup H ≤ Aut(X ), together with a homomorphism χ : H −→ S, for a suitable group S. Note that, in this case, the set L defined in Sect. 3.1 is actually a group. Such group action systems are exactly the so called automorphism group systems defined in [13] . According to the corresponding terminology of [13] , we will refer to the PHFs constructed from this special type of group action system as automorphism projective hash families (APHF). Even though it may seem plausible to look for p-diverse automorphism group systems leading to PHFs suitable for cryptographic applications, no concrete examples are, to the best of our knowledge, at hand. We will try to make a step further in this direction along this section.
Clearly, the natural starting point is a group X together with a special subgroup L which fulfills some special properties. 5 For the moment, let us keep in mind we aim at constructing a family of hash functions which will be easy to evaluate in L , provided some extra information (given by χ ) that should however not help outside L . Thus, we may consider a projection χ so that L is stabilized by all elements of ker χ. Moreover, for achieving p-diversity we should aim at examples in which actually L is maximal with respect to this condition, that is, for any
It is easy to see that with these conditions, L must exactly be the subgroup defined as in Sect. 3.1, i.e. L is exactly the set of points with singleton (ker χ)-orbits.
Also, we would like that non-singleton (ker χ)-orbits are as large as possible. A naive way to do so is selecting a group X s.t. | Aut(X )| has only large prime divisors. Actually, many known results relating |X | and | Aut(X )| could be used for that purpose. For instance, if a group X is complete, 6 then Aut(X ) X. Examples of complete groups are S n (n = 2, 6), automorphism groups of nonabelian simple groups, etc. (see, for instance, Chap. 7 of [12] ).
However, once the group X (and thus its order) is fixed, there are plenty of other factors influencing the soundness of this construction. Much research should be devoted in order to be able to provide concrete examples in this setting.
Examples
As we have already argued, it seems indeed hard to achieve new concrete constructions of PHFs making use of so called automorphism group systems. In the hope that the notion of action group systems introduced in this contribution may yield new ideas, we sketch some possible lines of future research. However, let us first see that at least our setting does not yield an empty theory, namely, that the known (abelian) constructions also fit our framework. Note that for any h ∈ Hom(X, Π) the mapping φ(x, π) := (x, h(x)π ) is actually an element of Aut(X × Π). Denote by Ψ the group monomorphism defined by:
is an automorphism group system from which a projective hash family can be derived as described in [13] (see also Sect. 4). Thus, all concrete constructions from [3, 4] yield examples in our new setting.
An example using linear groups. Let us consider the vector space X = F n q , with q prime, and
is a group homomorphism. Now, diversity of the corresponding group action system (X, H, χ, G L(d, q)) can be proven if H is chosen with care (ideally, |H | should only have large prime divisors).
A geometric example. Let π be a finite projective plane over a prime finite field F q . Automorphisms of π are usually called collineations, it is easy to see that the action of a collineation is faithful both on the point-set and on the line-set of π. An elation is a collineation fixing both each point of a fixed line l (called the axis) and each line through a point C in l (C is usually referred to as the center). Recall that the fixed points of a non-identical elation are exactly the points on the axis, while the only fixed lines are those incident in the center. Let X be the point-set of π , L a fixed line in π and C a fixed point on L. Take H as the group consisting of all elations with center C. Notice that every elation in H induces a permutation of the points of L , since the center C is contained in L . For basic notions on collineation groups of finite planes, see [1] .
Let us define χ as the group homomorphism translating each elation in H into the corresponding permutation of L .
Clearly, ker χ is exactly the subgroup of all elations in H with axis L . Note that, moreover, the points in L are exactly the points of X stabilized by ker χ. On the other hand, if A is an arbitrary point outside L, each elation in ker χ is uniquely determined by the image of A, that can be any point in the line defined by C and A, except for C (as an elation is completely determined giving its center, axis and the image of a point outside the axis). Hence, | ker χ | = q and therefore q-diversity is guaranteed in this construction.
Concluding remarks
We presented a general method for deriving cryptographically useful universal projective hash families based on group actions. Group action systems, our main building blocks, are inspired and also generalize so-called group systems introduced by CramerShoup. We point out how simple properties of the underlying group action system translate into security qualities of the derived cryptographic construction. In addition, our arguments allow for the use of nonabelian groups and may shed some light into the design of group-based cryptographic tools with sound security guarantees.
